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Gorovitz: At the End of Life

At the End ofLifo

SAMUEL GOROVITZ
In the summer of 1985, Dean Gorovitz was Visiting Scholar in Residence at Boston's Beth Israel Hospital. His observations and reflections
will appear in Hospital Philosopher (forthcoming), from which the following is an excerpt.1

lI
Samuel Gorovitz came to Syracuse
University as Dean of the College of
Arts and Sciences in August 1986. He
received his B.S. in 1960 from MIT and
his Ph .D. in philosophy in 1963 from
Stanford. Before coming to Syracuse,
he was professor of philosophy and adjunct professor of public aff.llrs at the
University of Maryland. His most recent book, Doctors> Dilemmas: Morfl,l
Conflict and Medical Caw, was published in paperback in 1985 by the
Oxford University Press.

r. Excerpted from the book Hospital

Phiwsophn; forthcoming from Oxford
University Press. <!:>1987 by Samuel
Gorovitz .
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~y

r:E HOSPITAL NEVER S10PS. At any hour of the
or night, people come and go, trudging through their routine chores, living out their private dramas, wrestling with their fears,
reacting to the unexpected. To the patient, anyone else is a visitor, the
doctor no less than fumily or friends. To the private practitioner, the
hospital is the most sophisticated of all medical resources, a complex
technology always available to aid a patient in distress. To the interns
and residents-the house officers-it becomes nearly the world, as the
long hours and heavy demands of their lives as physicians-in-training
leave little time or energy for anything beyond the hospital's walls.

It is 4:45A.M.; I have been asleep for ahout two and a half hours on the
lower bunk ofa stark, narrow cell containing only the bunks, two metal lockers,

a small nightstand, and a telephone. Light and noise .fWw in from the corridm; but with no mure effoct on me than on Arthur, asleep on the upper bunk
with the telephone, its cord stretched to the limit, inchesfrom his head. I have
no dreams, no recollectWns of the depressing drabness of the room, no awareness of the narrow bunk or thin, stiff pillow.
Sudt:lenly, Arthurgrabs the telephone on the first ring, emitting some syllable faintly SUif!Jestive ofreluctantly emerging consciousness. He listensfor ahout
two seconds, and in two seconds mure is at the door, shifting into high gear.
awhat have we got?'' I ask, groping for my shoes. Arthur, who had never
removed his, replies over his shoulder, ((Arrest on 7," and is halfway down the
hall as I bolt through the door in pursuit.
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By the time we get to the scene of the cardiac arrest, a dozen people surround the patient. The medical resident is choreqgmphing a resuscitation effort.
Arthur, an intern, leaps into the battle. In a matter ofminutes, tubes ofdiverse
kinds are threaded into varWus places-one into the neck, another into an arm,
a third into the lungs. The intermittent compressi<m of the patient's chest by
the rescue team lends a steady beat to the visual scene; various monitors add
their sights and sounds to the spectacle.
I drop back from the center ofaction, not wanting to intrude on this struggle
against death. The patient, of whom I have a clear view, is an older woman
lying large, pale, and unresponding at the center of the commotion. I wonder
whether she has ever before been the focus of so much attention, whether in
her conscimts lift there have ever been moments when so many people have acted
so single-mindedly in her behalf But she cannot enjoy this attcnti<m; I learn
that she has pervasive, end-stage cancer-that she has been in a comafor Seven:J,l
days prior to the cardiac arrest, responsive only to deep pain stimulus. I wonder
what the point can be ofthis tour de .fime ofmedical power; the intern answers
my unspoken question, softly and sadly remarking, «There's no point to this
at all." But his participation in the effort is uncompromising.
I notice an empty bed near the door; we are in 765, a semiprivate room,
and the action is around the bed near the window. There are rumpled linens
on the empty bed; I look around for its occupant. Like the others on the scene,
I want to be ofhelp, to do something useful. But I am neither doctor nor nurse;
at most I can hope to stay out of the way.
The count in the room is now sixteen, and it isgetting crowded. I slip into
the hall and look around. At the far end of the comdor a woman stands,
wearing a bathrobe, looking confused. I ask a nurse about the roommate of
the dying patient. She replies, «We try to get them out if we can. It can be
pretty upsetting to them. I told her she could go to the solarium."
«Where is tmnsport? Did you call them?" One of the doctors is eager to
get a bloodgas report, but the sample has not yetgone down for analysis. The
runner who is to take it to the lab has been called, but is nowhere to be seen.
A nurse calls again, complaining of the delay.
I walk past three or four rooms to the woman standing at the end of the
hall and ask if she is the displaced patient. She is, and volunteers that she
has been advised to go to the solarium. I tell her it's a good idea and walk
awng with her, just a few steps, into the comfortably furnished, unoccupied
room. I look out through the expanse ofglass at the panorama ofa city, peacefully agklw with the first light ofa new day. It is a beautiful scene, but Mrs.
A does not notice it. She settles tiredly into a chair, and looks quizzically at
me. «Has anyone told you what's going on?" I ask. «No," she replies, «but
it's Mrs. M. I hope she makes it. I don't even know her."
«The:fre doing what they can," I assure her. «But there are a wt ofpeople
in the room, and it's very crowded and noisy. I'm sure you'll be more comfortable here." She smiles at me and, comforted, says «Thank you, Doctor."
«pm just an observer," I answer, feeling a bit out ofplace, but not even
slightly tempted to explain my presence. As I walk back to the patient's room,
I think of how terrifYing it must be to be awakened by the sudden eruption
of a mortal crisis a few feet from one's bed and to find oneself moments later
at the end of the hall entirely aklne with one's own intimations of mortality
accentuated so abruptly.
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Back in 765, Mrs. M has begun to respond. Against the odds, the resuscitatWn is succeeding. Her heart is beating once again. Snatched back from the
jaws of death, hers is a life saved by dazzling interPentWn. She is, of course,
still in a coma, and is now on a respirator. But she is stable for the mmnent,
and the crowd around her begins to shrink.
I ask the resident if it would be appropriate for me to talk to the cricted
roommate, to tell her what the fuss has been about. He encourages me, so I
return to the solarium and give Mrs. A a brief summary of the situatWn.
She nods appreciatively; a nurse comes in and sits down with us. She takes
over where I have left off, now turning her attentWn to Mrs. A's concerns.
I head back to 765.
In the corridor, the conversatWn turns to Mrs. M's prognosis; it is agreed
that she has no significant chance of meaningful rec(!Very. Now that she is
stable, however, she mustgo to the coronary intensive care unit (ICU) where
her vital functWns can be monitored continuously. So a team ofsix slides her
from her own bed onto one with wheels, and amidst her medical entourage,
she is carted toward the elevators that take her down to the fifth fox»: Along
the way, the doctors and nurses pursue a questWn they raised as the rescue effort
began: why are we resuscitating this woman?
At one level, the answer is clear. She arrested, and when a patient arrests,
the response follows automatically, for better or worse, unless there is a DNR
order-Do Not Resuscitate-in the patient's medical chart. For Mrs. M the
chart leaves no room for doubt; a note from the attending physician reports
that he has raised the questWn with her children and that they are adamant
in both their refusal to approve ofD NR status and their insistence that everything possible be donefor their mother. So the hospital staffhad no choice within
the confines of the hospital's policy.
It is likely that she will arrest again. There is a flurry oftelephone activity.
The resident calls the attending doctor at home, then calls one of the daughters. With the attending doctor's approval, hegently raises the questWn ofwhat
should be done if there is another arrest. He agrees to meet the daughter later,
in the intensive care unit.
The crowd on seven has dispersed; Mrs. M is now in the ICU. There is
no roommate here, no winduw to the outer world. She lies on her bed, comprehending nothing, conscious of nothing, never to be conscious again. But we
are exquisitely conscious ofher-ofevery available detail ofthe fluids andgases
and pressures and rhythms of her faltering physiology. Here, she will remain,
under constant scrutiny, until some new turn ofevents signals the start of the
next round.
It is after six now. I am tired to the marrow of my bones, but there is no
point in going back to the «on-call" room. It is too late to get any real sleep,
and, anyway, I am not sleepy. My head spins with unanswered questWns. Have
I just witnessed an example of medical progress, of a medical nightmare, or
of both? How do these young doctors and nurses maintain their motivation
in the face ofsuch demanding tasks that offer so little gratification in return?
Why was there no D NR order for this hopeless, dying woman? When should
there be such orricrsf Mrs. M's children wanted everything possible done for
her. Have I just seen something done for her or to her? Should her physician
have been more assertive with her children in recommending a DNR order?
Why did the family want the futile struggle to continue? Should the wishes
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offamily members always be respected, no matter how strongly the medical
staff disagrees? What if the family members disagree among themselves?
Perhaps I am overreacting to the fUtility ofwhat I have seen. A more liberal
use of D NR orders might carry worse costs than the occasional bit offutility.
After all, Mrs. M was past minding what was done for or to her. She can't
really be thought ofas a victim. Yet it is horrible to contemplate the same sort
of end: hopelessly past sentience, splayed out naked on a bed, being worked on
by a bunch ofyoung doctors who would derive much more benefit from an extra hour's sleep than I can possibly derive from them.
Funny how my mind keeps returning to the idea of sleep. Fll have to sort
out all these questions later, when Fve had some.
I wander back to my office in the hospital. On the desk is the dmft of a
story written by the public affairs office for the hospitaPs monthly newspaper.
I have promised to review the dmft for accumcy and must have it done before
leaving at noon for a meeting in New York. But I have a meeting at nine
in OB-GYN, and at eleven there will be a discussion about a patient judged
mentally competent and then admitted to the hospital over her objections and
treated despite her protests. I certainly want to participate in that. So Fd best
do the dmft at once, before dashing back to my apartment to packfor New York.
The story explains the peculiar circumstances of my presence in the hospital; it carries the heading: ((Is there a philosopher in the house?)) I make several
corrections and suggestions on the dmft, leave the office, and walk out to the
hospital garage. I have been in my clothes for twenty-four hours and feel as
rumpled as they look. I am tempted to go home and sleep until it is time to
headfor the airport. But I recall that Arthur will soon be back on the medical unitfor the start ofa new day, caringfor patients, banteringgood-naturedly
with the staff, teaching and learning together with the medical students, the
residents, and the senior physicians. The thought shames me into resolving
to be on time for my meeting at nine.
I pull out of the garage, into the waking city, heading for the apartment
and the shower.
There was a time, long past, when saving lives whenever possible
was uncontroversial. Now we can sometimes save the lives of patients
whose prospects are so poor that no good purpose can be served by
doing so. Recognizing that fact is easy for most people. But it is hard
to become clear about what follows from that recognition . At least
the practice of striving always to save lives eliminates the need to make
painful distinctions among patients, classifying some as worth saving
and others not.
We would avoid those decisions if we could, but there are too many
pressures to allow us that comfortable escape. They come from many
directions. The most compelling pressure is our concern for the interests of patients; we realize that some patients may be harmed rather
than helped by life-sustaining treatment .
This is most clearly the case when a terminally ill patient is close
to death, is suffering, and then is threatened by infection or cardiac
arrest. In the days before antibiotics and sophisticated resuscitative techniques, such a patient's ordeal would then end. Now it can be
prolonged, so that some patients fear a medical response to their de-
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cline as an aggravation of their distress, rather than looking to medical
care with hope as a source of comfort. Sometimes, they seek to protect themselves in advance against unwanted medical treatment they
may be unable later to ward off; this they do by expressing their views
to family or physician, or through such devices as the "living will" -an
oddly named, written record of a person's objection to medical treatment that is death prolonging more than life sustaining. (Some hospitals now call this possibility to the attention of the communities they
serve, making sample "living will" declarations available and advising
that such documents be kept in a safe place and be made known to
"a person's family, physician, and legal counsel.")
Even when a patient has clearly expressed an objection to medical
treatment, the possibility remains that it will be imposed. A few highly
publicized cases, perhaps very atypical, nonetheless have fueled fears
about that possibility. One such case is that ofWilliam Bartling, who
in 1984- asked that his treatment be discontinued. He was terminally
ill, deplored his painful life on a respirator, was declining inexorably,
and knew it. The hospital took a firm position in favor of prolonging
his life to the maximum possible extent despite his objections. He
sought judicial relief; the hospital opposed him in that effort.
Thus the battle raged-the hospital fighting against death and
Bartling fighting against the hospital. In the end, on appeal, the courts
ruled in favor of Bartling's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. But
he never knew of that victory. He had declined beyond the point of
sentience, and then died, before the case was concluded.
It is a well-established and widely regarded principle that to impose
treatment on an unwilling patient is a tort. And the moral view is widely
shared that due regard for the autonomy of persons requires respecting their rights as individuals to decline what others may judge to be
in their interests. Then how could the Bartling case have happened,
and what does it suggest about modern hospital care?
Few of us will find the phrase "Doctor knows best" to be unfamiliar.
Doctors must rank close to mothers in this regard. Of course, there
are many things that doctors do know best, and how to prolong the
life of a seriously ill patient is now often among them. There is also
a deep and genuine commitment among physicians-the occasional
medical rogue aside-to serving the interests of their patients. That commitment can lead to zealousness in defense of life, a zealousness that
can distort the physician's judgment about just what is in the patient's
interest. And, increasingly, there is the fear of legal jeopardy.
In the Bartling case, there is reason to believe that his physicians
were willing to follow his wishes and remove him from the ventilatorbut only with the approval of the hospital's administration. The administration was willing to approve, but only with clearance from the
hospital's legal counsel. That clearance was not forthcoming, however.
The primary commitment of a hospital's lawyer is typically to minimize
that hospital's legal risk- a very different objective from that of serving
the interests of the patients. In this case, the hospital's attorneys, because of confusion about the law, misunderstanding oflegal precedents,
and concern to protect the hospital maximally against prosecution and

Published by SURFACE, 1987

5

Syracuse Scholar (1979-1991), Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 3

28-SYRACUSE SCHOLAR

litigation, rendered advice that was directly contrary to the interests
and expressed wishes of the patient, who paid the price in frustration
and continued suffering.
The current complexity of health care decisions is thus compounded
by the overlay of fear, suspicion, and self-protection that is a consequence of our overreliance on the courts as mechanisms of conflict resolution . Even when doctor, family, and patient agree about the
appropriate course of action, there may be bureaucratic barriers to pursuing that course. The patient's interests may not in the end prevail.
For that reason, it is all the more important that those interests be clearly
perceived from the beginning.
No patient's interests should be assumed on the basis of generalizations or convention. That most patients want their lives prolonged was
no reason to prolong Bartling's life. That physicians are most comfortable using their skills on the side of life is no reason, either. The lawyers' fear that legal action might flow from withdrawal of treatment
is obviously no good reason. But when, and how, to call off the medical troops?
The Bartling case was comparatively easy. He knew his circumstances,
expressed his preferences clearly and in a reasoned way, and was simply
a victim of bad legal judgment distorting medical care. Now that the
courts have found in his favor, it is somewhat less likely that future
patients in such circumstances will endure the same fate. And even
Bartling would have been spared that fate had he been in a less doctrinaire and more sensitive medical environment.
But one does not always have the luxury of clearly expressed patient preferences in situations of medical gravity.

I sit in my office) reading a roster of the hospital's administrative staff, trying to link the names with a dozen or two of the faces I have met in the last
day. The phone rings; a neurosurgeon has heard that I am at the hospital
and thinks I might be interested in a case he has just confronted. I meet him
immediately in the surgical intensive care unit (SICU).
The patient) eighty-two) otherwise ingood health) has fallen down a flight
of stairs) breaking his neck in two places. Rushed to the emergency room) he
was taken directly to surgery, but little could be done. His life has been saved)
but his spinal cord is severed near the base of his skull. He lies with his head
in traction) motionless) silent) with only the pulsating of the respirator to suggest that he is alive.
aHe is permanently paralyzed) completely, from the neck down/) the doctor
tells me. <<He can never breathe without the respirator. He will never be able
to speak) because ofthe respirator tube and because he can't produce the breath
necessary for speech.))
I ask about his brain) about his cognitive functioning. aWe don't have
any idea. He doesn't respond. He may have severe brain damage. He may be
terrified. His mind may be intact.))
awhat would you expect the natural course to be if you make no efforts
beyond maximizing his comfort?))·I inquire.
aifs hard to say. He'll get an infection) his heart will stop. In days) or
maybe weeks.))
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«And how long could you keep him alive?'' The docf;()r confirms my hunch.
indeterminate. A long time. Months. Years, maybe.''

«I~s

This patient is in no position to express his preferences, or anything
else. At eighty-two, if he regains significant sentience, he faces the
prospect of confronting total dependency as a silent quadriplegic. What
should he be told of his circumstances? Is it best that he survive? In
a case like this, the family must speak for the patient. Their knowledge
of him and their concern for him presumably combine to make them
the best available advocates for his interests. But the family too has
received a severe injury, and their distress clouds their perception and
their judgment.
Is a DNR order appropriate here? How clear should the physician
be in stating his own views to the family in the midst of their confusion and vulnerability? And what if the family wants "everything possible'' to be done, as they so often do? Is that devotion or guilt at work?
Is it an admirable tenacity or a denial of reality?

A nurse joins our discussion. She tells us that the patient will open his
eyes and look at her. But he does not n:spond in any meaningful way. Grasping
at straws, I suggest the obvious: <<Have you tried to get him to blink his eyes,
as signals?'' She has, he doeMt. But his skin is starting to bn:ak down in places
because ofthe pn:ssun: and friction ofcontact with the bedding. A special spaceage bed has been ordered for him fivm a company that n:nts such things to
hospitals; he will float on a cushion of tiny, aerated plastic sphen:s when it
arrives. That will help with the effort to pn:vent the bedson:s from becoming
horrible.
Several hours later, I n:turn to the SICU A grandson is visiting the patient. The young man stands beside the bed, speaking loudly. «Grandpa, can
you hear me? I~s Ben. Open your eyes, Grandpa!" The old man opens his
eyes. His head n:mains rigid but his eyes look to the left. He stan:s, expn:ssionless, at the sourr:e of the sound. Ben moves around to the right of the bed and
speaks again. The eyes shift to the right.
The grandson turns to the docf;()r and to me, and says, «He understands
every word. I know he does."
«Can you blink your eyes for me Grandpa? Blink your eyes at me." Then:
is no n:sponse.
It seemed to me that the patient understood nothing at all, that
the movement of his eyes toward the source of the familiar voice was
a fairly primitive response, signifying ;umost nothing about his mental
state. The grandson, I thought, was grasping at straws. That's a normal
reaction to tragic events, of course, and not a reaction to be criticized.
Still, if the perceptions of family members are distorted by false hopes,
how can they make reasoned judgments about what is best to do?
It is possible, too, that my own perceptions were distorted by a false
sense of hope. Knowing the man's physical plight, I suddenly realized,
I didn't want him to regain his mental acuity. I thought it better for
him never to understand the situation he was in, to worry about the
ailing wife who had been dependent on him, or to suffer the frustrations of a life of total dependency without even the capacity to ask
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questions or express himself. Surely that would be as close an approximation to hell on earth as one could devise. So the grandson and I
were each seeing what we preferred. But what followed for the patient's
treatment? In particular, should he be made DNR?
Boston's Beth Israel Hospital was among the first (r98r) to adopt
a formal set of guidelines governing the writing of DNR orders. That
policy, four and one-half typed pages, became a model for policy statements and statutes in other places. It states clearly that the expressed
wishes of a competent and accurately informed patient must be
respected, and describes procedures designed to assure a cautious and
reliable assessment of the patient's competence and level of understanding. The family must be informed of a request by the patient for a DNR
order and of the hospital's intention to honor that request . But the
family cannot overrule the patient.
The incompetent patient presents a greater challenge. And whatever
was true about Grandpa's level of understanding, it was clear to everyone that he was in no position to participate in deliberations about
the management of his treatment . The guidelines call for careful assessment of such cases, documentation of the process, and in some
instances, prior judicial review. The process differs somewhat according to whether or not the patient is terminally ill. Was this patient?
I couldn't decide.
He had been stabilized in respect to the immediate trauma of his
fall. Without vigorous life-support treatment, providing nutrition, respiration, and response to infection, he would soon die. He could do
nothing-literally, chillingly, absolutely nothing-for himself, ever again.
His life was over. Yet he was alive and could be kept alive. Somehow,
the distinction between patients with terminal illness and other patients seemed far too crude to fit the circumstances.
My thoughts turned to two questions. What is the best outcome
we can hope to achieve, and how should it be determined? The guidelines hint at some of the answers, but they leave the hardest questions
unsettled, as guidelines and policies always do. How much easier life
would be if just once, someone somewhere could write a policy that
really answered a morally challenging question : Always do this, never
do that . The appeal of the idea is easy enough to understand; it is the
appeal of simplicity in the face of a complex challenge. But it never
works. There's always a Grandpa or two, waiting in the wings to thumb
their noses at the guidelines by demanding that judgments be made
where the guidelines leave off.
The guidelines at Beth Israel reflect this fact; primarily, they leave
the hardest questions to doctors and family to work out together in
the patient's interests. In the Bartling case, no such procedure worked
effectively. Sometimes, it does.

It is Monday. I have 1Wt been in touch with the hospital over the weekend.
I sit in my office) preparing the first seminar I willgive for hospital staff Will
anyone show up) I wonder, already aware ofthe severe lack of unallocated time
in the schedules of hospital workers. And what shall I say to them about ethical issues in health care? Which tip of the iceberg shall I choose?
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Some newspaper clippings from last week's Boston Globe lie on my desk.
Om headline reads, «New Medical Society lifo-support policy.)) The article reports
that the Massachusetts Medical Society has decided that it may be acceptable
in some cases to withdraw foeding tubes from certain hopelessly ill patients who
will die as a result. This new policy has not been announced in any fonnal
way; insteiui, it has come to light in court testimony on the Brophy case. Brophy
is a fimner fin:man who has been comatose for two years. His wifo has asked
that his foeding tube be withdrawn, basing her n:quest on her husband's oftexpn:ssed opposition to being sustained by artificial means. No one is sun: what
is right to do, so the case is befon: the courts.
Another headline, six days later, reads, «Comatose man's guardian opposes removal offoeding tube.)) So the disputegoes on. But it isn't like the Bartling
case, for Brophy is long past all consciousness. Whatever the outcome of the
case, Brophy won't mind.
I decide to go upstairs to the SICU. The room of the eighty-two-year-old
man is empty. I find the doctor, who tells me that the family decided, after
several visits to the hospital, several conversations with him, and several conversations among themselves, that a «comfort only)) mode of matment was
most appropriate. So a D NR order was written and the patient wasgiven mild
analgesic medication to ease any discomfort from the respirator or traction. In
two days, he was gone.
The decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment must surely be as hard
as any that arises in a hospital or within a family. Principles to guide
such a decision are elusive, because whenever the question arises, some
of our most cherished values are in conflict. We believe in the value
of life, but it is not clear that all life has value no matter what. We believe that suffering should be reduced, but sometimes that means shortening life. We believe that patients' wishes should be respected, but
that seems not always best for the patients. We want doctors to be stalwart champions oflife, but we fear their capacity to impose continued
life. We want to be able to say, of a single case, "enough is enough;'
yet we do not want to undermine the general respect for life that protects us all.
The need for clarity about these matters grows steadily as more and
more cases demand such vital decisions. There are several reasons why.
Success at treating various illnesses keeps patients alive who would otherwise have died; they then can become potential challenges to medical
decision making. New capacities to sustain life are developed with great
frequency; they each have clear beneficiaries, but they each expand the
range of our dilemma. The demographics of our national population
foretell a large increase in older citizens, both in absolute numbers and
as a percentage of the population. More and more, those in hospitals
will be upwards of eighty-five; many of them will be people of failing
health who can be kept alive despite substantial deterioration. They
will be our grandparents, then our parents, then us.
In an effort to make a constructive contribution to the discussion
of these matters, the federal government conducted an extensive inquiry into decisions to forgo life-sustaining treatment (LST). That study
was conducted by a short-lived agency named the President's Com-
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mission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The commission published a dozen reports
during its three years of existence; its report on LST, at 554- pages, is
by fur the largest. It is a sensitive, insightful, humane, and realistic document. But it does not answer the question, "What, in this case, should
be done." Instead, it recognizes that within certain constraints, such
decisions must always be made through a process of discussion and
reflection involving those persons who are immediately affected by the
case.
For that sort of process to be successful, it helps for the various parties to be able to draw on a reservoir of thought about decisions at
the end of life. But too often these questions must be resolved by people
thinking about them seriously for the first time.
We gather each day at u:oo A.M. in a small conference room on Four
North to spend an hour discussing the patients on the unit. The medical students stay put; so does «the Visit/) a senior physician who serves as a mentor
to the younger physicians. The interns and residents come andgo at the whim
of their beepers.
Rarely do many minutes go by without that high-pitched staccato intrusion. It is hard to remember that each beep is just the translation ofa human
call-sometimes of a desperate cry. There's a brief instant of uncertainty and
distraction every time. The sound is always the same) so it i~t obvious who
is being called. The beepers seem like t:Villittle agents of a conspiracy against
rational discourse and unhurried reflection. <<Wholsgot a case?)) asks the Vis-it.
Several ofthe house officers shuffle through their ubiquitous 3" xs" cards. One
of them says) «J~s pretty quiet. Mr. L is going home. Nobodys febrile. We
had a few admits last night) but nothing special.)) A few of the patients are
discussed very briefly.
A beeper goes off Two residents) seated beside one another, each reach for
their beepers. Everyone else glances) at least briefly, to see who is getting the
call. One ofthe residents pushes the switch on the bleating device; the beeping
stops and through the int:Vitahle static a voice instructs) «Call extension 4138. ))
She leaves the room to use the telephone in the hall outside; she may be back
in seconds) or not at all.
«Hws Mrs. G?JJ asks the Visit. «Still out of her mind/) replies the resident. «Weve tapered the steroids and her hematocrit is still okay, but we tfonlt
expect to see imprrwement in per mental state for several more days.))
Pd met Mrs. G a few days earlier. She claimed she was blind) that shed
lost her vision. But she would~t open her eyes! Then the head of the medical
unit) Dr. L) took her by surprise. «Mrs. G) can you identifY that doctor by
the door? Do you know him? Have you seen him before?))
She looked) named the doctor, closed her eyes again) and held firm to the
claim that she was blind. She also objected that the hospital was trying to starve
her, that shed had no food for days. A nurse whispered to me that Mrs. G
had refUsed to touch breakfast earlier that morning) despite the efforts of the
nurse to induce her to eat. Later, the physicians concluded that the most likely
explanation of the dementia was a reversible psychosis caused by her medications. The trick would be to reduce her steroids enough to eliminate the mental
problems without reducing them too much for her underlying medical problems.
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I think) aonce again) the Great Pharmacological Balancing Act.)) The
woman comes in sick) and there's no way to tell what dosage will make her
better. Put simply, at thirty milligrams) her blood)s nogood; at.finix her blood)s
fine) but she's nuts. Is there a place in between) where her blood will still be
okay without her being kxmy? Nobody knows for sure) and the only way to find
out is to keep changing the dosages and see what happens. It's all an experiment. She's the subject) and there's no getting out of it.
I wonder how the case will be handled if there is no middleground) if the
only way to keep her in acceptable physical health is going to keep her mind
in a mess. I wonder, too) whether some distressed family member might think)
ashe was sane when she went in) and they've made her cmzy. That ought
to be worth a million or two.)) I imagine the headline: ((Doctor sued for making patient crazy.)) Pve spent enough time with doctors now that Pve started
to have malpractice fantasies myself At the same time) I wonder if these doctors have done all they can to help the patient and family understand how
difficult it often is for doctors to figure out what to do. Have they maintained
the traditional medical mask ofinfallible competence? Or have they been open
about the limitations of their art?
An intern presents another case) reporting on one of the new admissions.
She is ninety, and complains ofpain in her side. The history shows she's been
in before) eleven years ago) for breast cancer. She had a mastectomy and radiation therapy, but rejected advice to start chemotherapy. Now, eleven years later,
she's back) coming to the emergency room with a complaint ofsevere chest pains
on awakening.
To my surprise) the doctors speak admiringly of her independence of mind)
of how she's come out ahead on hergamble. Once again) their mixed feelings
toward poweiful drugs ·is evident.
There's little to be done for her now. She's been ruled out for a myocardial
infarction but seems to have metastatic disease. No one speaks in jiwor ofvigorous
treatment. ((Make her comfortable and send her home/) they agree. It is understood that she is likely to be back) when things are worse.
I break my silence on the case. ashe's lucid now, seems to have clear opinions about her medical care. The next time she comes in) she might not be.
Wouki it make any sense to find out what her wishes are about medical management while she's able to discuss such things? For instance) how does she feel
about DNRorders? She refused chemotherapy; maybe she woukin't want resuscitation ifshe came back in bad shape and then arrested. Does anybody know?
Will people wait until she arrests to wonder about that?))
I sit back and listen. The residents begin by talking about the diffUsion
of responsibility. It isn't proper for an intern or a resident to mise such delicate
issues with patients; that's the responsibility oftheir own attending physicians)
they agree. ((The patients don't really view us as their doctors/) one of them
notes. Yet the attending physicians are themselves often reluctant to mise such
issues. Q;tickly, the conversation turns to the difficulty ofconfronting these matters. One resident turns to the Visit) and asks) ((How do you do it? What
can you say? I mean) you can't just walk in and say 'Good morning) and by
the way, you)re in pretty bad shape) you know) and the oki ticker couki just
stop any time now, so what do you want us to do about that? I mean) shouki
we start it up again) or have you had enough?) You can'tgo in like that. But
what can you do?))
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For once) the room is silent. Everyone feels the weight of the question. The
Visit nods) acknowledgirw its gravity. Then) gently, he replies.
aTo br;gin with) you can>t do it standirw up. You must sit down next to
the patient. And you have to listen a lot. Sometimes it helps to hold the patient>s hand.))
He goes on to explain that doctorf are afraid of death) offailure) of beirw
blamed. These fears are barriers to discussirw death with patients) and consequently with discussirw end-stage management. I think ofanother aphorism
for the Good Patient>s Handbook: ifyou are dyirw) remember that your doctor
needs all the help you can provide.
The conversation continues for almost fifteen minutes. I listen with admiration)· these are carirw) sensitive people) pursuirw an issue that causes them
pain) but that they cannot avoid. I am content to let the discussion run its
course.
It is noon; and the clock rules. The conference ends and we disperse. In
the hall) I catch up to one of the residents and ask him how often he has participated in such discussions in his trainirw. He stops and seems to turn inward for an instant. Then he replies: ((Well) of course) I have to deal with
those problems when they come up. And it isn>t easy, but I do the best I can.
As far as havirw the chance to talk about it like that) well) Pve been here
for three years) and it>s never happened before.))
Some patients are so ill that regardless of their own previously expressed views toward the prolongation of life, the physicians treating
them believe, or are at least tempted to believe, that the allocation of
human and economic resources to that treatment cannot be justified,
This is an extremely discomforting attitude for health care providers
to have; the culture of medicine has long held that the physician's obligation is to serve the interests of the patient, whatever the cost, and
that questions about the allocation of resources can comfortably be
set aside for others to address (or for physicans to consider in their capacity as citizens, apart from the context of the treatment of particular
patients). But medicine's increasing capacity to sustain life in the face
of dismal prognoses makes the question of resource allocation harder
and harder to avoid in clinical settings.
The issue arises most clearly in intensive care units, which provide
the hospital's costliest context of care. (In one hospital, in which the
ICUs include less than 9 percent of the beds and provide less than 8
percent of the patient-bed-days [a patient in a bed for a day], over 20
percent of the total hospital budget and of nursing staff time are absorbed by the ICUs.) This is no surprise; that's where the sickest people
are, which is why the care, and the costs, are intensive. Despite a national surplus in total hospital beds available, ICU resources are sometimes in great demand. Yet, because they are the most costly resources,
they are the hardest to expand.
The problem is especially acute in urban, public hospitals, where
occupancies are increasing in part because of more numerous transfers
of the uninsured to such hospitals. (There have even been confirmed
instances of such patients who, having failed the wallet biopsy in the
emergency room of a private hospital, were transferred to public hospi-
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tals while still in mortal danger.) As public hospitals increasingly become a sort of de facto national health insurance system, compensating for collective negligence at the national level, the financial pressures
on them increase, and their ability to enlarge their capacity diminishes.
Serious perils attend this situation . In one case, a hospital in the
South admitted the victim of a terrible automobile accident, despite
the fact that the ICU was already filled beyond its normal capacity.
The patient did badly and a lawsuit resulted. In the trial, knowing that
the hospital had provided less intensive ICU care than the normal census
would have allowed, the jury awarded the plaintiff $12 million. That
seems to provide a strong argument for locking the doors when the
ICU is full, and perhaps posting a "no vacancy" sign in front of the
emergency room. But some doctors are beginning to consider a different way of addressing the problem.

The speaker at the anesthesia department>s lecture on ethics and intensive
care is the director ofan ICU at one of the other Harvard teaching hospitals.
He describes the current difficulties as he experiences them) emphasizing the
apparent irrationality of turning away a patient with good prospectsfor recovery just because an ICU is already filled) when some ofthose filling it are nearly
hopeless cases. He proposes that the custmn ofrespecting senWrity in the ICU- the
<<jirst come) first served) and once served entitled tv remain)) principle ofaccess-be
replaced by the atlbption ofan «Intensive Care Entitlement Index/) according
tv which each patient>s prospects for recovery would be assessed) perhaps daily,
with ICU space tv be made available according tv the patient>s index. Too law
an index could result in refusal of access; it could also result in removal from
the unit in favor of a newcomer with a higher index. It is not obvious that
any such index can be coherently determined) but the speaker suggests various
formulations of how it might be calculated.
A questioner challenges the necessityfor such a radical departure. The speaker
replies by describing one of the experiences that prompted him tv rethink how
access tv the unit is allocated. A twenty-one-year-old male) struck by lightening) had excellent prospectsfor recoverx but was turned away because the ICU
was full. At the time) there were five patients in the unit who had no significant prospect of recovery. They were kept alive because it was possible) not
because it made sense. And the prospective patient had no recourse in competition with those who outranked him simply by getting intv the unit sooner.
(Perhaps the young man survived the delay and was treated successfully elsewhere; we are not tv/d.)
The debate continues) with several physicians either challenging the possibility of devising any such index or raising alarms about its possible misuse.
The scheme strikes me as preposterous; I have visions ofpeople being moved in
and out of ICUs the way teams move in and out offirst place. But is that
any less preposterous than what the present situation al/aws?
A doctor comments who is troubled both by the problem and by this proposed solution. These matters cannot be resolved by doctors) but must be raised
by them. «We have tv project these questions intv the public arena) so that
a public negotiation will ensue/) he concludes. The visiting speaker agrees. And
then he goes back tv his ICU tv treat the patients already there and tv worry
about those who may be on the way.
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